Haiti

Haiti’s criminal landscape has been shaped by the country’s tumultuous history, marked by longstanding political instability, economic challenges, and repeated natural disasters.

Gangs and other criminal networks in Haiti have gained strength and influence since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, which remains unsolved. The Caribbean nation’s lack of legitimate political leadership, paired with its worsening security situation, has led some experts to warn that Haiti’s domestic crime problems could have long-term, region-wide impacts.

How Does Haiti’s Geography Lend Itself to Organized Crime?

Haiti is one of the 16 sovereign countries in the Caribbean region. It occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic to its east. To its west, across the Windward Passage, lie Cuba and Jamaica. To the north sit the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Bahamas, and the US state of Florida.

The nation’s porous maritime and land borders and its proximity to the United States make it an ideal transit point for drugs arriving in planes and boats from Colombia and Venezuela or traveling overland to and from the Dominican Republic. Unmanned border checkpoints, clandestine airstrips, airports, shipping ports, and secluded docks along the country’s extensive coastline have long helped traffickers move drugs through the country. Heavily dependent on international imports in nearly every sector of its economy, Haiti hosts an extensive exchange of goods and services that give criminal actors an opportunity to smuggle contraband. 

The country’s location has made it particularly vulnerable to hurricanes and earthquakes, which have caused significant economic damage and resulted in political instability. These disasters have generated flows of international aid to Haiti, but these have been the subject of corruption scandals. International post-disaster assistance has also extended to the security realm, but those deployments have also been plagued with problems. Haiti’s turbulent political situation, frequent natural disasters, and gang activity have led nearly 1.5 million Haitians to flee the country. This exodus has fueled the growth of migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks that traverse the dangerous and, at times, fatal seas between Caribbean neighbors.  

Haiti’s internal criminal landscape centers around its capital area of Port-au-Prince, with principal regions nearly totally controlled by armed gangs. These structures exercise control over all access routes to Port-au-Prince, including maritime approaches to the main ports, internal road networks linking the capital to the north and south of the country, and the principal land routes connecting Port-au-Prince to the border with the Dominican Republic.

Gang territorial dominance enables near-complete regulation of movement in and out of the capital and generates revenue from extorting commercial traffic. Such control requires sustained access to military-grade firepower through arms trafficking, a supply that rivals that of Haitian security forces.

What Is Haiti’s Organized Crime History?

After becoming a French colony in the 18th century, Haiti’s enslaved population revolted in 1791, led by Toussaint L’Ouverture. Haiti finally declared its independence from France in 1804, becoming the first nation to successfully overthrow its colonial enslavers.

Following independence, Haiti was beset by economic hardship and political instability. Many Haitians attribute the country’s financial woes and underdevelopment, which persist today, to exorbitant reparations that France forced Haiti to pay throughout the 1800s as indemnity for gaining independence. Haiti has also been subject to foreign interventions, including a repressive occupation by US forces from 1915 to 1934. The United States would later provide significant support to authoritarian rulers in Haiti, most notably the Duvalier family, led by François “Papa Doc” Duvalier and later his son, Jean-Claude, nicknamed “Baby Doc.” The father-son duo ruled Haiti as a brutal dictatorship from 1957 to 1986, when Baby Doc fled to France during a popular uprising.

During this period, the country became a criminal haven. Through the 1970s and 1980s, most cocaine consumed in the United States was trafficked through the Caribbean, including Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Drug trafficking became a major source of income for Haiti’s political and business elites, who used their connections to protect drug traffickers and launder money. The government of Jean-Claude Duvalier was particularly notorious for its involvement in drug trafficking. The regime provided protection and logistical support for Colombian drug traffickers, including Pablo Escobar, who used Haiti as a transit point.

In 1986, protests and strikes motivated by economic and political grievances ousted Baby Doc Duvalier. Haiti underwent a brief democratic transition in 1990 when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president. However, Aristide was overthrown in a military coup and forced into exile the following year. A military regime ruled the country until 1994, when US troops intervened to restore Aristide’s rule. Upon returning to power, Aristide disbanded the Haitian army, a move that ousted a highly corrupt security force but also limited Haiti’s infrastructure for fighting organized crime and drug trafficking.

During the latter half of the 1990s, Aristide’s presidency was marred by his alleged involvement in corruption, political violence, and drug trafficking. During his terms as president, Haitian drug traffickers worked with the Medellín Cartel, and later the Norte del Valle Cartel, to move hundreds of tons of cocaine from Colombia through Haiti and into the United States. These networks allegedly bribed local officials, police, and even Aristide himself.

In 2004, Aristide, who had forged his own ties to criminal networks, was overthrown again, and a UN peacekeeping mission was established to stabilize the country. Drug traffickers continued to shift their operations to overland routes via Central America after authorities cracked down on smuggling along the maritime passage. Nonetheless, the US State Department estimated that by 2006, 8% of the cocaine reaching the United States still went through Hispaniola.

In 2010, a devastating earthquake killed over 200,000 Haitians, displaced millions more, and caused widespread destruction.

In 2011, shortly after the earthquake, Michel Martelly was elected president, inheriting control of a country with dire poverty levels, rising violence, and deep-seated corruption. Martelly was accused of embezzlement in the famous Petrocaribe scandal, which broke into public view in 2017, involving the disappearance of $3.8 billion from a Venezuelan oil subsidy program meant to provide discounted oil to Haiti. He was also tied to street gangs, drug trafficking, and money laundering.

In 2016, Haiti again held elections, but fraud and voter suppression allegations sparked protests and delegitimized the newly elected Jovenel Moïse. In 2018, protests erupted across Haiti, calling for the resignation of Moïse, who was accused of corruption and mismanagement of the country’s resources. Instead of resigning, Moïse overstayed his presidential mandate, sparking a constitutional and political crisis that culminated in 2021, when Moïse was assassinated at his home in Port-au-Prince. The murder plunged the country into further political turmoil. Ariel Henry became the acting prime minister, while the country erupted in protests and violence.

Since the assassination, the Haitian government has not found its footing and struggles to control much of the country. Pervasive gang governance of Port-au-Prince, mass kidnappings, and the never-ceasing flow of guns into Haiti have contributed to its continued deterioration.

In 2022, the UN, the United States, and Canada imposed coordinated sanctions targeting Haitian gang leaders, politicians, and business elites for their alleged role in drug trafficking, money laundering, and financing criminal activity, but there have been few consequences so far. 

The following year saw the formation of a gang coalition, known as Viv Ansanm (Living Together), which unifies the country’s two main criminal factions—G9 and GPep—in a common front against the government.  In early 2024, the coalition launched a series of attacks on public infrastructure that paralyzed Port-au-Prince and shut down Haiti’s main airport, leading to the resignation of then-president of Haiti Ariel Henry.

Months later, a Haitian group tasked with governing the country and organizing elections called the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) took power. It failed to organize elections, was plagued by corruption allegations, and was dissolved in 2026. US-backed Prime Minister Alix Didier took full governing control of Haiti in February of 2026. Shortly after, Kenyan police contingents of the MSS mission officially pulled out of the country, and the UN reconfigured the organization into a new initiative called the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). In April 2026, the GSF mission deployed military officers from Chad to bolster Haiti’s defense against gangs.

Who Are Haiti’s Criminal Groups?

Hundreds of gangs exist throughout Haiti, and Port-au-Prince has seen the worst violence stemming from criminal groups. The UN estimates that the gangs control most of the capital city, but many Haitians believe nearly the entire city has fallen under the control of criminal groups. 

In recent years, the country’s gang landscape has been dominated by two gang factions. The first, G9 and Family (G9 an fanmi – G9), is a gang federation encompassing some of the strongest gangs in Port-au-Prince. G9’s leader is Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbecue,” a former police officer. The group was previously linked to the Moïse and Henry’s Haitian Tèt Kale Party (Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale – PHTK), acting as vigilante enforcers for the party. Barbecue cut ties with them after Moïse’s assassination, however, as the group has gained significant political capital in the areas where it operates in Port-au-Prince.

G9 and Family are focused mainly on extortion but also carry out kidnappings for ransom and have, in some cases, taken over public services such as electricity or water provision for payment. Barbecue and G9, for instance, have blockaded Terminal Varreux, Haiti’s largest oil terminal, a coordinated effort by criminal groups to restrict access to fuel across Haiti to destabilize the government.

The second gang faction is G-PEP, another federation and historic rival of G9. PHTK’s political opponents have broadly supported the group, but it remains unclear to what extent it receives material or financial support. At times, they have allied with 400 Mawozo, a separate gang that rose to prominence through mass kidnappings of mostly Haitians but also foreigners, including that of 17 Western missionaries in 2021.

Many other gangs exist, such as the 5 Seconds (5 Segonn) gang, which has seized critical infrastructure and facilities like Haiti’s Supreme Court building and ransomed the government for their release; the Kraze Barye gang, which is based in Port-au-Prince and rose to prominence after killing several police officers and burning down a police station in early 2023.

The final months of 2023 saw the birth of an unprecedented alliance between the G9 and G-PEP federations, both seeking to form a united front against the state. The alliance, dubbed “Viv Ansanm,” or “Living Together,” has given the gangs a platform to sow political chaos by launching coordinated attacks against critical infrastructure, including airports, seaports, government buildings, and prisons. 

Repeated attacks on key infrastructure have paralyzed the capital city, derailing efforts to restore order and allowing Viv Ansanm to expand into new territories. In 2024, gang activity surged across departments near Port-au-Prince, displacing thousands of people. Young boys, in particular, are targeted for forced recruitment by criminal groups, as internal displacement and economic precarity make this demographic more susceptible to trafficking and extortion.

According to the UN, at least 26 gangs, nearly half of whose members are minors, now control a vast majority of neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince and have displaced at least 1.4 million people through violence.

In recent years, gangs have massacred hundreds of civilians, with criminal groups such as Gran Grif murdering dozens of people in 2024 in the Artibonite region, just north of Port-au-Prince, and the Wharf Jeremie gang killing nearly 200 people in Cité Soleil months later. In March 2026, gangs carried out a multi-day attack on towns in Artibonite before the expected arrival of the GSF, with gang members burning homes and shooting dozens of civilians, displacing thousands more.

How Are Haiti’s Security Forces Stuctured?

Haiti has weak security forces plagued by corruption, ineffectiveness, ties to gangs, chronic understaffing, poor training, and underfunding.

The principal law enforcement agency is the Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haiti – PNH), which was created in 1995 to replace the disbanded Haitian Armed Forces, accused of human rights abuses and involvement in coups.

The absence of a functioning elected government means that security forces face little supervision or instruction and have often veered into crime. Chronically underpaid PNH officers have been accused of involvement in arms trafficking, state-sponsored massacres of civilians, and direct ties or membership in some of Haiti’s gangs.

Haiti’s Coast Guard, part of the Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d’Haïti – PNH), suffers from similar understaffing, despite being tasked with guarding the more than 900 miles of coastline.

The depth of gang control in Haiti prompted the creation of an international security force, backed by the United Nations, to support the country’s threadbare police. But the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, deployed in mid-2024 and led by Kenyan police officers, did little to oppose the gangs amid shortages in staff and funding and uncertain political backing.  The initiative’s shortcomings triggered a restructuring of the MSS into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), again authorized by the UN Security Council. 

In 2025, the TPC confirmed the government was using foreign contractors to combat gangs, with the most significant deal being with Vectus Global, led by Erik Prince, the former CEO of private military contracting firm Blackwater. 

Since then, Vectus has deployed roughly 200 Salvadoran contractors to train local police to target gangs with off-the-shelf drones loaded with explosives—a military tactic appropriated from Ukraine.

Haiti has also seen an increase in armed self-defense members deployed alongside state forces to curb the expansion of Viv Ansanm and other gangs. In April 2023, a vigilante movement known as the “Bwa Kale” gained traction following the lynching and burning of 14 gang members. Since then, acts of self-defense have developed into organized militias alongside state forces. Semi-permanent barricades at neighborhood entrances, patrols, temporary checkpoints, and identity checks to control access to communities and detect potential gang members have increased in urban areas throughout the country as police forces have increased permits to carry weapons for citizens. 

But the relationship between security forces and civilians can also be fractious. According to UN reporting, between March 2025 and January 2026, police and state prosecutors have killed over 1,000 Haitians in security operations against gangs. Human rights groups have flagged the drone campaign of state security forces for injuring dozens of civilians, including children.

Haiti’s Judicial System

The judicial system in Haiti has faced many challenges in recent years, including limited resources, corruption, and political interference. Overburdened by postponed judicial appointments, an upsurge in violence, and protests by judges and court clerks calling for improved salaries and working conditions, the system has all but collapsed.

In June and July 2022, gangs invaded the Supreme Court building in Port-au-Prince, destroying records and evidence. 

Vigilante actors have also carried out judicial frameworks and punitive actions leading to gang retaliation.

Haiti’s Prisons

Haiti’s prisons are plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, limited resources, and poor oversight.

The prisons house a range of detainees, many of whom committed misdemeanors, like petty theft or minor disputes, or are imprisoned arbitrarily for protesting, as well as violent criminals and gang members.

Over 80% of the nation’s approximately 7,500 prisoners are being held in pretrial detention, according to 2025 UN estimates.

Repeated mass prison escapes further highlight weaknesses within the penitentiary system. Over 170 inmates escaped in a single riot in 2016, while over 300 broke free in 2014 during a shootout between guards and armed assailants. 

Prisons also suffer from a critical shortage of food and staff, leading to well over 100 incarcerated Haitians dying in 2022. In 2024, the capital’s two main prisons were attacked by gangs, leading to the escape of 4,600 inmates and the strengthening of several gang leadership structures. In response, Haiti declared a state of emergency, a strategy it also brought against the country’s central region in 2025.

Haiti’s broken prison system has recently sparked violence from the “Bwa Kale” vigilante group, which has turned to extrajudicial street executions and public mob lynchings. The few operational prisons outside the capital face major overcrowding and have high inmate death due to starvation and disease.