
The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) is a Colombian criminal group that emerged in 2017. It arose from a criminal alliance between dissidents from the former 32nd and 48th Fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and members of La Constru, a criminal organization formed in 2006 following the demobilization of the paramilitary blocs of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC).
The group is primarily involved in drug trafficking in the department of Putumayo, where it controls coca-growing areas and oversees the transport of cocaine and marijuana shipments to exit points in Ecuador and Brazil — sometimes in collaboration with networks and groups from Cauca and Nariño. To secure its control and deter the expansion of its rivals, the group has imposed harsh control measures, including illegal checkpoints, the killing of social leaders, curfews, and widespread threats against the local population.
History
The Border Command formed in 2017 in the southern department of Putumayo, shortly after the peace agreement was signed between the FARC and the Colombian government.
Initially known as “La Mafia,” the group was a pact between dissident elements of the FARC’s former 48th and 32nd Fronts and La Constru, aimed at reviving drug trafficking in Putumayo. The dissidents focused on protecting coca crops and processing sites, while La Constru leveraged its international contacts to handle drug sales.
During the group’s early years, violence was relatively restrained. Residents of several municipalities told InSight Crime at the time that they even perceived a sense of peace in the area.
But that changed in 2018, when the First Front — also known as the Carolina Ramírez Front and affiliated with the ex-FARC Mafia’s General Central Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) — entered Putumayo from neighboring Caquetá. This sparked a violent conflict between the two factions, with clashes peaking in 2022 and 2023. Since 2024, confrontation levels have declined, with each group controlling clearly defined territories.
In 2020, the group rebranded as the Border Command – Bolivarian Army after allying with the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the former FARC led by Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez.” The Border Command quickly became one of the Second Marquetalia’s largest substructures. In return, they received political and ideological backing, allowing them to consolidate control over southern Putumayo and expand into the departments of Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá, and Amazonas.
In October 2022, the group released a video stating its intention to join President Gustavo Petro’s flagship security initiative, “Total Peace,” alongside the Second Marquetalia. However, the alliance collapsed in November 2024 following a deterioration in relations between the two criminal groups. The Border Command chose to continue dialogue with the government through the newly formed National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), a coalition that also includes the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico), another FARC dissident group led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”
Leadership
The group was initially led by Pedro Oberman Goyes, alias “Sinaloa,” who was killed by fellow fighters in March 2019. He was succeeded by Miguel Antonio Bastidas Bravo, alias “Gárgola,” the leader of La Constru, who remained in charge until his capture later that year.
Since then, the group has been led by Giovanny Andrés Rojas, alias “Araña,” who has also been the face of the group in peace talks with the Colombian government. However, in February 2025, during the third round of negotiations, he was arrested after Interpol issued a red notice in his name.
His capture reportedly caused a rift between the group’s leadership and mid-level commanders, the latter now appearing to operate independently. According to Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office, the group maintains around 1,000 fighters across its areas of influence.
Allies and Rivals
The Border Command originally maintained an alliance with La Constru. Under this arrangement, La Constru held sway in urban areas while the Border Command controlled the countryside. Over time, the two groups merged into one.
After breaking ties with the Second Marquetalia, the Command’s main ally became the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee and its leader, alias “Walter Mendoza.”
Given the disconnect between negotiators and commanders in the field, mid-level leaders have forged more direct ties with drug trafficking networks in Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá, and Amazonas to maintain the flow of narcotics to exit routes.
The Border Command’s main rival is the Carolina Ramírez Front, with which it has clashed repeatedly over key trafficking corridors in southern Colombia.
The Choneros, one of Ecuador’s most prominent criminal groups, has tried to expand into Colombia’s Putumayo region, threatening the Border Command’s control of drug routes. Despite several confrontations, the Border Command has held on to full control over the lower Putumayo region.
Geography
The Border Command’s stronghold is in the municipalities of lower Putumayo — Orito, San Miguel, Valle del Guamuez, and Puerto Guzmán — along the border with Ecuador, where they also maintain a sporadic presence. Authorities in Ecuador’s Sucumbíos province have previously uncovered camps and propaganda linked to the group.
The Border Command also attempted to establish a permanent presence in parts of Caquetá — particularly Cartagena del Chairá, El Paujíl, La Montañita, and Solano — and in some municipalities in Cauca, Nariño, and Amazonas. However, they later pulled back to Putumayo to contain the advance of the Carolina Ramírez Front.
Outlook
The Border Command remains one of the most powerful criminal groups in southern Colombia. Their presence in Putumayo — one of the country’s top coca-producing departments — has given them significant leverage in the drug trade.
But the lack of progress in peace negotiations and the arrest of their top commander have fragmented the group’s operations. Locals increasingly say the group is no longer as strong as it once was. Its split from the Second Marquetalia left it without political or ideological backing, and its current actions are focused more on generating profit through drug trafficking and extortion.

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