Will Thomas on Putting Boards of Corporate Criminals on Probation

If a corporation is convicted of a crime – say causing a major airline crash that kills hundreds – what’s the remedy? How about putting…

If a corporation is convicted of a crime – say causing a major airline crash that kills hundreds – what’s the remedy?

Will Thomas
Michigan Ross School of Business

How about putting the board of directors of that corporate criminal on probation and appointing a member of a passenger safety advocacy group on the board of the company? 

In a new law review article in the Georgia Law Review – Corporate Boards On Probation: Repurposing Stakeholder Governance Into Corporate Punishment – University of Michigan Business Professor Will Thomas proposes a new path towards stakeholder governance –  not by revising corporate law, but rather by building stakeholder-friendly sentencing into corporate criminal law. 

“When a firm’s excessive pursuit of shareholder value contributes to serious criminal misconduct – endangering its workers, deceiving consumers, or harming communities – federal courts should leverage their considerable sentencing authority to empower injured stakeholders in fighting back,” Thomas wrote. 

“The core proposal, punitive codetermination, would require a convicted corporation to appoint stakeholder directors to its board for a term of probation, giving voice to those harmed and creating incentives for reform from within.” 

“Stakeholder-friendly sentencing leverages insights from stakeholder governance, mediated by distinct institutional prerogatives of criminal law, to reach what is ultimately a more tractable, cohesive policy than stakeholder governance offers on its own.” 

“Its authority draws from existing sentencing powers, aligns with current trends in corporate criminal enforcement, and avoids stakeholderism’s policy paralysis by tying stakeholder empowerment directly to a corporation’s criminal misconduct. In doing so, stakeholder-friendly sentencing reframes stakeholder governance – not as a replacement for shareholder primacy writ large, but instead as a fitting response to shareholder primacy run amok.”

You continue to write about corporate crime. Most recently, you wrote a law review article for the Georgia Law Review titled Corporate Boards on Probation: Repurposing Stakeholder Governance into Corporate Punishment. Give us the nutshell.

“The nutshell here is there’s this long-standing view about stakeholder governance,” Thomas told Corporate Crime Reporter in an interview last week. “The idea is that corporations should care about employees, customers, local communities –   all the people who contribute to the company’s success.” 

“That seems obvious and yet from the law’s perspective, stakeholder governance has just chronically failed to convert that common sense intuition into actionable legal policy. There are a number of reasons why the stakeholder governance movement has never taken root in corporate law.”

“It feels like every couple of years, this idea comes back up and then it disappears just as quickly. So this project is offering a new pathway for folks who are interested in stakeholder governance.” 

“Basically, what I’m saying is – let’s reimagine how we could employ these pro-stakeholder instincts we have as a specific response to corporate misconduct. When a corporation’s excessive pursuit of shareholder interests leads them down the road to serious criminal misconduct, we shouldn’t just be thinking about fines. We shouldn’t just be thinking about checking the compliance box. What I’m suggesting we do is we require the firm to appoint stakeholders to the board of directors to actually give them voice, to give voice to the people who are harmed and to drive cultural reform from inside the firm.”

You call it punitive codetermination.

“Yes. Codetermination is a corporate law concept. It comes from outside the United States, particularly in Germany. In Germany, you have codetermined boards, which means a portion of the board of directors comes from elections by shareholders, and a portion comes from people selected by the employees.”

“And I want to leverage that idea in the context of criminal law to say – whenever we see some kind of corporate misconduct, chances are there is a stakeholder group that is acutely harmed or ignored by the corporation. They are the ones who got injured. That could be employees being injured in the case of a serious industrial disaster. That could be the environment being harmed by out of control environmental practices. It could be consumers.”

“Whoever the stakeholder group is who is harmed, I want to leverage codetermination and give those groups a seat at the table. And that would mean using the criminal justice system to appoint a representative for whichever stakeholder group it is – be it the employees, be it the local community, the environment, even the customers, to have a voice in the boardroom.”

So let’s say Boeing is convicted of a crime related to these two crashes that killed 346. The judge, under this punitive codetermination program, could appoint passenger rights advocates to the board?

“Yes. And in the paper I try to walk through several high-profile, well-known court disasters, Boeing being one of them, and show how the core insight of punitive court determination is pretty flexible.” 

“Criminal proceedings naturally revolve around this question of – who was victimized by the crime? The people who were victimized by Boeing were the passengers. So first you identify the victims.” 

“The proper response here is to give that group a voice on the board. We’re going to give them one or a few seats on the board for a fixed period of time in an effort to steer the corporation to a better outcome.”

Under current law, do judges have the authority to impose what you call punitive codetermination? Or would it take legislation?

“I argue that actually judges already have the power to impose this sanction through their probationary powers. Judicial authority here comes through a mix of statutes and sentencing guidelines. In both the statute and the guidelines, there is a power to impose a term of probation for three to five years, and then there is a power to craft specific conditions that go with that probation.” 

“Some of those conditions are laid out. There are a bunch of standard ones, like promising not to commit a crime again. But there’s an open-ended power that says judges are allowed to impose a condition as long as it is reasonably related, either to the corporation or to the crime committed.” 

“What I suggest is that judges use that power somewhat frequently. In fact, for a while, a lot of the more compliance-centric reforms that we saw people crafting to become a law were coming through that catch-all power. The remedy not only fits within that term, but actually, in many ways, is very tightly connected.” 

“If the thought is we want a condition of probation that’s reasonably related to the nature of the offense, that’s what I’m offering. I’m offering a solution that is directly tied to the underlying structural problem giving rise to abuses.” 

“If the problem is we are systematically overlooking the interests of employees in a way that causes them harm, then we should put a representative in a position where they can actually have those concerns raised before we get to future crimes.”

Is there any precedent for this type of action in U.S. law?

“We’ve certainly seen governance interventions happening through the criminal justice system. There are two that are related to this practice, although not exactly the same. One is just a broad set of compliance reforms that are either imposing committees on a board, new internal reporting lines, new ways to surface information up the ranks of the corporation.” 

“The other thing we’ve seen somewhat frequently is the imposition of a corporate monitor. The corporate monitor is similar in some respects to this sort of stakeholder director, but also importantly different.” 

“A corporate monitor’s job is to act as sort of an external policing agent. They are at the firm. They are often sitting either at the director level or at least engaging with the directors. But the monitor’s job is to tell the corporation if a rule is broken or maybe it’s about to be broken.” 

“The monitor is telling you how to comply with the rules. What I want a stakeholder director to be able to do is influence the board and culture so that the structural temptation to break the rule is addressed in real time.” 

“While the stakeholder directors have not been commonly used in criminal justice practices, I think that already the federal system has been looking at ways to engage in governance, and this is just the next step.”

The vast majority of corporate criminal settlements are no longer guilty pleas. They are these alternative settlements, like deferred prosecutions, non-prosecutions. That’s a way of sidestepping a judge’s probationary authority, isn’t it?

“That’s correct. I’ll call them criminal resolutions. There are three categories here. One is the traditional conviction and sentencing that we always associate with criminal law. In the middle is what you’re talking about, something called a deferred prosecution agreement. This is where the government reaches a civil agreement with the company. The government says –  we’re going to hold off on prosecuting you for some period of time, and if you have complied with our deal after however many years, then we’ll drop the charges. That middle ground has a little bit of judicial oversight, but not much. Basically, the judge is there to recognize that the government is sitting on its indictment. The judge doesn’t have a lot of substantive oversight over the terms of the agreement.”

“And then all the way at the far end of the spectrum are non-prosecution agreements or just dismissals – these are entirely outside the scope of the legal system. These are just private agreements between the government and a company.”  

“But the courts have remedial criminal powers. In other words, the federal government stands at its strongest in this story when it is acting through the official statutory powers of sentencing. And what that means is that my proposal is harder to pull off in these prosecution agreement settings, where you aren’t really using the powers of the sentencing court, you’re instead just engaging in private contracting.” 

“But I do think that even in the world of prosecution agreements, there’s space for this kind of remedy. The fact that courts might be imposing this adds to the list of things prosecutors might want to put on the table. But it is also the case that prosecution agreements generally provide companies a way to sidestep a lot of the more harsh sentences that they would get through the criminal justice system, which I think is sort of its own problem. And we have seen over the years more or less use of these prosecution agreements as different administrations come in.”

Many of these alternative prosecution agreements include provisions for monitors, for example. So you could see cranking that up to appointing a member of a victim group to the board as a condition of a deferred prosecution agreement.

“Yes, the fact that monitors are being imposed through these prosecution agreements is a signal that we could do something similar with stakeholder governance. Now, interestingly, this is one situation where I think the board itself might actually prefer to have some kind of court order that is helping to carry out this practice.” 

“When I describe stakeholder governance, I actually break it into two steps. There’s the appointment of a stakeholder director. And the other thing that judges can do, and they often do, is they can impose what we call a remedial condition. Whatever is causing the harm, you need to go in and address it. And I suggest having a legal order that actually empowers the board to focus more directly on stakeholder interests than they might otherwise feel that they’re able to do.”

“The board thinks what they are supposed to do under ordinary corporate laws is just focus on the shareholders. The board might say – if we take into account stakeholder interests,  we might get into legal trouble. By contrast, if there’s a court order saying – Boeing, you have a systemic problem with your neglect of the interests of passengers, you need to fix it – the board can say –  ‘Look, our number one priority is complying with the judicial order. So, of course, we’re going to focus on the stakeholders because the court is requiring us to do that with criminal law.’” 

“So, prosecution agreements can put in place some of the elements of my proposal, but there’s an interesting sense in which actually the firm would be better off going through the criminal justice system because it gives the board more legal protection to carry out this fundamentally stakeholder enterprise. 

Is punitive codetermination your idea?

“I’m unwilling to take credit. If I go back in time, I see flavors of this idea popping up. Christopher Stone’s book from two decades ago – Where the Law Ends – is one of the first times that I remember reading anybody talking about the idea of imposing reforms at the board level as a way of remedying misconduct. Stone is not focused directly on criminal law and how it applies in the U.S. system, but certainly there are predecessors to this idea. There’s sort of old antecedents that I’m pointing to and trying to build out.”

Although I just asked AI and it said you came up with the term.

“That’s fantastic, and the nice thing about AI, last I checked, is it also thinks I’m a history professor at the University of Michigan. So my stature is growing day by day.”

“So yes, the term is mine. I’m certainly stealing codetermination from the literature. It was my way of signaling that when people talk about codetermination, they have a corporate law idea in mind. What I want to emphasize is that when you shift from corporate law to criminal law, it alters how we think about many of the problems associated with the underlying policy ideas.” 

“When we think about corporate law, we’re interested in efficiency, we’re interested in application of rights and responsibilities among inside parties. We are interested in private ordering. Those are all virtues unique to corporate law.” 

“But when we talk about criminal law, we’re talking about a whole different set of things – we’re talking about deterrence, we’re talking about rehabilitation from wrongs done, we’re talking about imposing sanctions and punishments.” 

“One of the standard complaints about stakeholder governance, if you talk to corporate scholars, they say – this is going to lead to inefficient outcomes. It’s going to lead to a less successful corporation.”

“But criminal law is engaged in causing friction and causing punishment to the parties. So, if you tell me imposing my sanction is going to impact their profits. I would say – yeah, that’s what all corporate punishments are doing. So why not impose a corporate punishment that’s going to have a salutary effect on corporate governance?”

[For the complete q/a format Interview with Will Thomas, 40 Corporate Crime Reporter 44(12), November 9. 2026, print edition only]