
By Jenny Kitzinger, 26th August 2026
Since the AGNI judgment I’ve closely followed developments around deprivation of liberty and I’ve written about what changes in the meaning of “deprivation of liberty” might mean for my brain injured sister, Polly. So, when I found myself near London and with an unexpected free morning, I was pleased to discover that the lists showed two Court of Protection hearings about deprivation of liberty at First Avenue House, the London headquarters for the court. Both hearings were listed as public, and both were for one hour before Senior Judge Hilder.
This blog is about the 11.30 am hearing on 17th August 2026 (COP 20015410).
Transparency
I turned up at First Avenue House with no notice at all (because I was not sure I trusted my train to get me there on time), but a member of the court staff was very welcoming, provided printed copies of the Transparency Orders for both hearings, and showed me to the waiting room. He also kept me informed about when the hearings would start (both a little late) which meant I could then catch my breath. Knowing I was now in the right place and on time to attend, I also emailed requesting the ‘Gardner documents’[1] or position statements, to back up my verbal requests at the desk.
Once in court, HHJ Hilde asked if I’d received the Transparency Order and whether I wanted any other information and then asked the barristers about the availability of the relevant documents – none of which were easily produceable for me, so the judge simply provided a succinct verbal summary, which was invaluable in allowing me to follow proceedings.
Overall, this was also a very positive experience for me as an observer. Although some judges can treat our presence as disruptive or time-consuming, Senior Judge Hilder made it all seem easy to accommodate me in court. She is an exceptionally clear communicator, and her clerk is welcoming and well versed in the principles and practice of transparency.
Background to the case
The protected party [P] in this case is a 25-year-old man with ADHD, mild intellectual impairment and autism.
He currently resides in a supported living placement (with one other resident, and a care team). He has 10 hours of one-to-one supervision during the day as well as waking night supervision. There are locked doors and windows, CTV motion censors in communal areas, and a perimeter fence. In addition, due to having committed a criminal offence, he is under probation restrictions which mean he cannot go out by himself.
P also has no access to internet on his phone: it is not a ‘smart phone’, and is only really functional for calls and texts. He is supervised when accessing the internet using a device other than a phone.
The hearing was focussed on his residence and care arrangements – and specifically, on trying to progress determination of capacity and decide what restrictions should be continued and where a trial of reduction in some restrictions might be in his best interests, if he could be provided with specialist support.
He was represented, via the Official Solicitor, by Victoria Butler-Cole KC who joined online.
One of his mothers (they’d adopted him when he was a toddler) was present in court. I think she was a litigant in person.
The London Borough of Haringey was represented by Joanna Thom
The hearing
The barrister for the Local Authority (the London Borough of Haringey) informed the judge that the expert report prepared for the court found that P lacks capacity in relation to decisions about legal proceedings, care, and use of social media, but that he does have capacity to engage in sexual relations.
His mother clarified that she agreed he had capacity to engage in sex but believed he needed support around knowing the age of his sexual partner and knowing “how you have a relationship”.
Pre-discussions between all parties had resulted in an agreed draft order placed before the judge which explicitly stated that he has capacity for sexual relations but lacks capacity to make decisions “about with whom he should have contact”[2]
All parties seemed to agree that the main restrictions are in his best interests, at least for the moment, with the exception that there was discussion about how to increase his access to the internet.
The judge had spoken with him that morning (a “polite and delightful young man”) and, despite the objective restrictions on him, he’d told her that his experience of where he was living now was going “brilliantly”. It is “homely” and he feels warm and safe there, and he accepts the restrictions.
He had, however, told her he was very unhappy about having a what he called a “brick phone” without internet access: – “he didn’t even want to show it to me as he is embarrassed by it”.
He can’t make video calls or use it to organise football or cinema tickets or order take aways, nor – he’d explained – could he use it to address problems with his universal credit. The judge said she’d talked to him about ‘Cyber Spider’, a safeguarding service supporting safe internet use, and he was in principle okay with having the Cyber Spider App put on a phone with internet access. She added: “I said his phone wouldn’t change overnight, but we would try to sort it”.
It soon became clear that when Senior Judge Hilder says she will try to get something sorted she is determined to do so, and leaves little room for error or delay. A significant part of this hearing was used to ensure that initial efforts to reduce P’s restrictions in this area would be followed through and that the order was written in a way that would support this to happen quickly.
Ms Thom for the Local Authority (the London Borough of Haringey) said that the Local Authority had agreed to commission Cyber Spider, and was simply awaiting confirmation of the time frame. Some judges might have left it there. Not Senior Judge Hilder. The conversation then went like this:
Judge: Be more specific please in the order about when Cyber Spider will be available
Ms Thom [Local Authority]: The request had been made.
Judge: Has it been sent to Cyber Spider?
Ms Thom [Local Authority]: There’s been an agreement they’ll be commissioned, but the invoice needs to be paid in advance.
Judge: Specify in the order a date by which that invoice will be paid.
It was agreed to specify (by way of recital) the date of 21st August 2026. The judge then asked when a Cyber Spider assessor would talk to P and how long the assessment would take. Once she had this information she wanted at date of 28th August 2026 as the assessment deadline and then turned to questions about getting P’s phone back, so the software could be installed on it.
Judge: The hardware – how will we get that?
Ms Thom [Local Authority]: His phone is currently held by the police.
Judge: How will the handset be made available. My understanding is that the police haven’t released the phone to [P], and won’t release it to either of his mothers. So there needs to be an order which allows that phone to be released.
The judge then went on to check who would give the order to the police and collect the handset (the mother said she would) and whether there was a named police liaison officer (there was). The judge suggest that the Local Authority send the order in advance to the named officer (as well as his mother taking in the paperwork), so that the police would then be ready to hand over the phone.
Once she had checked the timetable and step-by-step process Senior Judge Hilder concluded by saying that the order should include the statement that the court was expecting the phone to be available to him, with the Cyber Spider App on it, by the 4th September 2026.
The rest of the hearing was devoted to trying to ensure appropriate support services. It was clear this had so far not been provided. Ms Butler-Cole commented that: “Currently his placement is not far short of prison if no support is being provided to reduce restrictions.”
It seemed that the Trust (North London NHS foundation Trust) had not provided support via the community ‘single point of access” mental team nor via the learning disability team – apparently partly on the grounds that this young man doesn’t have a learning disability. “But in Dr X’s report that diagnosis IS given – so we can start with that team” said Ms Butler-Cole. The Local Authority was going to send the medical report to the Trust. The judge asked for the name of the person in the Trust who would receive the report, and added “By the time the order is submitted I’d like that specified”.
The Official Solicitor was clearly very concerned about what had happened. Their position was that the judge should order the NHS Trust to say if he was not being accepted by either the mental health or the learning disability team and, if so, to explain why not. She requested disclosure of correspondence regarding attempts to get referrals. The judge agreed and stated that disclosure should be of correspondence from 25th April 2025 onwards (the date when these legal proceedings first started). A deadline was set for 4pm on 1st September 2026, by which time the Trust must disclose what referrals they’d received, the outcomes of those referrals, and specify how they proposed access to the support he needs going forward.
If there were to be no acceptable response from the Trust, a hearing would take place on 18th September 2026, with the Trust joined as third respondent, and attendance required at that hearing. Provision was made for vacating the hearing if the Trust gave an acceptable response.
Reflections
The family, Local Authority and OS seemed to be working closely together to try to ensure that restrictions could be reduced, and to ensure that the Trust would provide appropriate support in future.
Obviously, it should not take a court case to resolve such situations, but sometimes it seems to be necessary. Families frequently report having to fight for support for vulnerable children and adults and how difficult it can be to engage the appropriate services. After my own sister, Polly Kitzinger, was brain injured in a car crash, I quickly realised that there were not just barriers to service provision, but also a maze of false promises, false starts and delays. As a family, we certainly learned about the need for persistence and attention to detail if Polly’s needs were to be met and some professionals reacted by describing us as ‘demanding’, ‘obsessive’ or ‘failing to trust’ the collaborative process. I’ve sometimes been seen as confrontational for demanding the name of a responsible individual to contact, for writing ‘too many’ letters as I tried to follow up on failures to act, or, for example, for my eventual insistence that letters were signed for on arrival so there’d be proof they’d been received.
Senior Judge Hilder (and the OS) seemed very familiar with how difficult it can be to ensure that organisations follow through on their responsibility and how easily a timetable can slip. I was interested at one point to hear Senior Judge Hilder apologise to Ms Butler-Cole for being “dictatorial” on a particular point that she was going to put in the order. The very choice of the adjective ‘dictatorial’ reflects Senior Judge Hilder’s authority to, quite literally, dictate the contents of the court order – authority lacking for a sister, even one (like me) who is a court-appointed welfare deputy, trying to advocate for appropriate levels of service provision.
Failing to provide appropriate support to vulnerable people has huge costs for the individual, those around them, wider society and for the very services that are so over-stretched. These costs in some cases include the demands placed on the Court of Protection and (in this case) the litigation costs for the Local Authority and the OS. There should be a more efficient way of dealing with the problems.
Senior Judge Hilder should not have to make detailed orders to ensure that protected parties have access to appropriate services – but I’m glad she does. She was very much on top of the material in this case, and in control of her court room. I admire her obvious commitment to understanding and addressing the problems faced by a particular individual, her knowledge of how a person might fall between the gaps of service provision, her obvious awareness about how delays can occur, and her sheer attention to detail to ensure her order would be as effective as possible.
I do hope the Trust gives an acceptable response to SJ Hilder’s order and that services are now put in place. I hope that the hearing on the 18th September 2026 can be vacated – but I won’t hold my breath.
Jenny Kitzinger is co-director of the Coma & Disorders of Consciousness Research Centre and Emeritus Professor at Cardiff University. She has developed an online training course on law and ethics around PDoC and is on BlueSky as @JennyKitzinger. She is also Health and Welfare Deputy for her sister, Polly Kitzinger.
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